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The Scope of Allocation in the Public Sector
Some ambiguity surrounds the concept of "public good" and "pul)lic
want" in discussions relating to the allocation of resources in the public
sector of the econpmy.

While there is broad agreement that goods to which

the "exclusion principle" does not ap_ply clearly pertain to the Allocation
Branch of the public economy (to use Musgrave Is three•-·branch approach to
budget policy)> the case of goods to which the exclusion principle applies
at least in part but which either are subject to decreasing costs or give
rise to significant external effects is less clear-cut. 1

The aim of this

paper is to analyze the relationship between these three types of goods and
their relevance to the allocation of resources in a normative fiscal framework.
My definition of public good, which I i;,hall seek to justify below, is

a good which the market mechani.sm either cannot provide at all
can provide only with a considerable degree of inefficiency. 2

or which it
Goods in

the first category, referred to here as social goods, satisfy what Musgrave calls
"social wants,

11

those wants to which the exclusion principle does not apply

since they must be consumed in equal amounts by all 3
also speak of "indivisibility in consumption

II

In this case one can

since consumption of these

goods cannot be tailored to the individual tastes of consumers as is true
instead of goods supplied through the market.

In the second category are

1

see R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A .§_!~idv in Public
Ec0.E£,l]Y. (New York: McGrmv-Hill Book Co., Inc.), 1959, Chapter 1.
2

This definition differs from Musgrave I s (ibid., p.. 44) > for whom
public goods are "goods the inherent quality of which requires public pro
duction."
3
rbid., pp. 8-12.
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found goods of two different kinds, firstly those goods whose provision is
marked by diffuse and significant external effects on consumption
at the national or the local level, and secondly

either

those goods produced by

indivisible factors of production under the condition of decreasing costs
in the relevant range of the market demand curve.

For the sake of convenience

these two types of goods, which are not mutually exclusive, will be referred
to as near-social goods and decreasing··cos·t goods

respectively.

Near-social goods correspond roughly to the satisfaction of what Musgrave calls

"merit wants," which are considered so important to society

that they are provided publicly, even though the· exclusion principle may apply.
Musgrave states that

"the satisfaction of merit wants, by its very nature,

involves interference with consumer preferences

11

by an "informed group. "

which exercises leadership in a democratic society, 1
to me to miss the point.

This definition seems

As 11usgrave himself remarks, this interference into

the want pattern of others may become a dangerous tool in the hands of an
authoritarian government seeking to extend its power and impose its particular
views on the rest of the people.

Such a government may.freely interpret the

consensus of society so as to suit its own ends

instead of depending,on the

consent of the governed,
It seems unnecessary to rationalize the satisfaction of near-social
wants in that way.

Surely the advantages of subsidized low-cost housing
'
and of universal education are seen not only by an enlightened few, but by

a majority of the people, and the satisfaction of these ,-1ants need not

involve any more serious a departure from consumer sovereignty than is
true of social wants proper,

A more useful way of describin 6 near-social

wants is to say that their satisfaction consists both of direct individual
consumption to which the exclusion principle could apply and of collective
consumption to which it could not.

They are thus located somewhere along

the continuum that goes from private wants .to social wants, their satis
faction creating significant externaliti.es on the consumption side.

This

points to the fact that pure social wants are the polar instance of e)cternal
effects, since their satisfaction is mainly external and collective and
little or none is private and individual.

This is recognized by Musgrave,

as is the fact that his "merit wants may involve substantial elements of
social wants.

,l

I think it therefore more appropriate to make the degree

of externality the criterion for deciding

on the social quality of a

given good or service as regards consumption, while conceding the diffi
culties involved in making such a concept operational.
vaccination are two examples of near-social goods.

Education and

In both cases there

is a direct benefit accruing to the immediate recipient, as well as an
indirect benefit to the society as a whole.
The case of decreasing-cost industries has received considerable
attention in the literature, 3

Efficient allocation requires the industri

1
Nusgrave, QE. ~it.. , pp. 8, 13.
2

For a succinct statement of the problems involved, as well as an
extensive bibliography, see Musgrave, _ibid., Chapter 7, pp. 136-140.

to produce at a level where price falls short of average cost.
is therefore needed to secure an optimal output.
that of a bridge.

A subsidy-

An oft-cited example is

If maintenance costs are independent of the rate of its

utilization, the cost of an additional crossing is zero and so therefore
is the efficiency price once the bridge has been built,

The exclusion

principle can normally be applied to decreasing-cost goods, if at great
administrative cost (as in the case of roads in an urban area).
application. where marginal cost is zero

leads

Its

however. to inefficiency,

Even if MC is not zero, efficient pricing can only cover variable costs but
not fixed costs.

To know whether investment in such industries is justified,

it is necessary to have recourse to a political decision-making process
.
1
just as in the case of social wants (and, I would add, near~social wants),
The feature which is common to social goods, near-social goods and
decreasing~cost goods

is neither the non-applicability of the exclusion

principle nor the presence of externalities or of decreasing costs, but
the fact that their efficient provision can only come about through a
political process instead of through the market mechanism.

It is this

feature ,,hich I invoke as my justification for including all three 'as public
goods in the Allocation Branch of an efficient Fiscal Department. 2
The above classification shows that the difference between social and
near-social wants is one of degree rather than of kind (hence the designation
1
2

Ibid.. , p. 139.

These of course do not exhaust the functions of the Allocation Branch,
which comprise others such as antitrust action and the control of monopoly
due to lack of free entry. See :Musgrave, ibid,, pp. 6-8.
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I use for the latter), since both involve to a greater or lesser extent
externalities or indivisibilities on the consumption side.

In the limit

(that is, in the case of pure social goods) the consumption of X does not
subtract anything from the consumption of Y or Z,

use is therefore zero.

The cost of marginal.

Decreasing-cost goods, on the other hand, usually

differ in kind from the other two types of public goods since the indivisi
bility is on the production rather than the consumption side. 1

This point

appears to be overlooked by.Bator in his otherwise admirable discussion of
·publ·ic sec t.or. 2
t h e scope o f t1e
I

Bator identifies "public goods 11 \vith

the satisfaction both of Husgrave's "social wants" (he then refers to them
as "pure public goods") and of -what I have referred to as nea1·-social wants.
He cites a bridge as an example of a pure public good on the strength of
the fact that the cost of an additional crossing is zero. 3
It seems to me that the case of a bridge belongs instead to the
immediately preceding section in the same chapter [Where the "Invisible
Hand" Fails (1)

J,

where Bator discusses the failure of the market to

efficiently allocate resources in the decreasing-cost sit1,1ation. 4

Indeed,

in that very section he cites the bridge as an example of a good w:i:th a
large initial fixed cost and low (zero) variable cost.

The reason for

1This

is not to deny that a decreasing-cost good may also give rise
to externalities of consumption. For example; a new road or bridge may
raise nearby real estate values or lead to increased economic activity in
the neighborhood.
2

see F.M. Bator, The Question of Government Spending:
and Private Hants, (New York; Harper & Brothers), 1960,
3
1bi~., pp. 93-98.
lf

Ibid., pp. 88-83.

Public Needs

','
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using the bridge as a~ example in both sections is apparently the confusi6n
of a good or service the cost of a marginal unit of which is zero (such as
an additional crossirig of a bridge) with a good satisfying a social want,
where the cost of marginal use by an additional person is zero, since
consumption is a function of total supply.

The first involves the marginal

cost of production, the second the marginal cost of consumption, and these
are conceptually distinct.

In the first case demand schedules are added

horizontally, in the second case
to say that

11

11

1

It is therefore incorrect

in a sense, as use of the bridge as an example has already

implied, a 'public good
costs.

vertically.

1

situation is simply a polar instance of decreasing

Instead I have argued above that it is more appropriate to regard

such a social want situation as a polar instance of external effects on
collective consumption.
The above considerations apply both to developed and to underdeveloped
countries.

In the latter, however, a fourth responsibility of· the Alloca

tion Branch adds itself to the three already discussed, namely the integrated
planning of the industrialization of the country.

The need for this

springs from the presence of what Scitovsky has called

11

....

pecuniary external

economies 11 derived from (indirect) interdependence among producers through
the market mechanism.

2

-·

The social benefit arising from the expansion of

a given industry diverges fro~ its private profitability because (inter
ali-_i0 of the cheaper products it makes available to other industries.

l.Th.isi,' p. 96.
2
T. Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Economies," The Journal of
Political Economy, April 1954.
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Investment therefore tends to be less than optimal because of the impossi~
bility for a certain industry to forecast what future demand and supply
conditions will be.

These externalities on the production side call for

action by the Allocation Branch just as much as the previously mentioned
externalities on the consumption side and indivisibilities both of con
sumption and production.

